James J. Wirtz of the Naval Postgraduate School noted that states collectively are much more susceptible to being surprised, and less interested in using deception themselves, if they see themselves as relative strong materially vis-`a-vis a prospective enemy, but that people become much more receptive to warning after they experience a traumatic failure.91 Wirtz illustrated his point by comparing the poor warning performance of U.S. intelligence and senior intelligence consumers before the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941 with the very good performance by some of the same individuals soon thereafter in the intelligence preparation for the Battle of Midway of June 1942. Wirtz argued that the “cognitive framework” of people makes a big difference in whether they are receptive to unconventional ideas.92 The argument can be extended to suggest that good warning personnel are relatively immune to what might be called the “political climate of the times” and they are able to retain a degree of curiosity and skepticism when most others around them, including the people leading their organizations, are sanguine. This trait is especially important when a temporarily benign international security situation leads consumers and intelligence leaders to pay less attention to threat warning intelligence. Similarly, DEI adherence has become a dominating domestic ideological and

James J. Wirtz of the Naval Postgraduate School noted that states collectively are much more susceptible to being surprised, and less interested in using deception themselves, if they see themselves as relative strong materially vis-`a-vis a prospective enemy, but that people become much more receptive to warning after they experience a traumatic failure.91 Wirtz illustrated his point by comparing the poor warning performance of U.S. intelligence and senior intelligence consumers before the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941 with the very good performance by some of the same individuals soon thereafter in the intelligence preparation for the Battle of Midway of June 1942. Wirtz argued that the “cognitive framework” of people makes a big difference in whether they are receptive to unconventional ideas.92 The argument can be extended to suggest that good warning personnel are relatively immune to what might be called the “political climate of the times” and they are able to retain a degree of curiosity and skepticism when most others around them, including the people leading their organizations, are sanguine. This trait is especially important when a temporarily benign international security situation leads consumers and intelligence leaders to pay less attention to threat warning intelligence. Similarly, DEI adherence has become a dominating domestic ideological and